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1. Introduction
Every scientific discipline, in the semantic terms, is a set of theoretical constructs, i.e the‐
ories, concepts, ideas, etc., of different levels of generality. One of paradoxes of develop‐
ment of the science lies in the fact that the more general and fundamental are constructs
of such kind, the less clearly can they be delineated at the level of common understand‐
ing and defined by means of formal language of the given discipline. As a result, the lat‐
ter  may  be  likened  to  a  building  with  a  very  shaky  foundation  (basic  concepts),  with
pretty loosely aligned walls (derived concepts), and with a roof just looking quite solidly
(the facilities of solving technical problems).
The idea of  the  species belongs to such basic  conceptions in the biological  sciences,  this
idea  has  being  been  acknowledged  repeatedly  over  the  centuries.  Accordingly,  in  the
light  of  the  above paradox,  the  species  notion was  and remains  to  be  among the  most
disputed  and  controversial  in  biology,  with  a  compass  of  viewpoints  ranging  from  ac‐
knowledging the unconditional  and self-evident  objective reality of  the species  to deny‐
ing  it  as  an  objective  (natural)  phenomenon.  Despite  the  efforts  of  generations  of
theoreticians,  it  appeared impossible  to  reach  a  universal  and all-suiting  understanding
and definition of  what  is  the  species  of  living organisms,  i.e.  the “biological  species” in
its most general (not particular Mayrian) sense.
The fundamental nature of the species notion in biology has led to an attempt to estab‐
lish a particular biological discipline about it proposed to be called “eidology” or “eidon‐
omy” (after the Greece term “eidos”, see 2.2; not in sense of Husserl) [1-6]. Its focal point
was declared to be development of  some general  theory of  the  species  of  living beings,
which would explain both the existence and most general properties of the species as a
natural  phenomenon,  along with variety  of  its  manifestations  in  different  groups of  or‐
ganisms reflected by particular species concepts.
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Disputability  and  ambiguity  of  the  basic  notion  of  the  species  has  generated  the  well-
known “species problem”, which appears to be of the same fundamental character to bi‐
ology as  that  notion.  It  was explicitly  highlighted in the early 20th century [7-8],  but  it
is  clearly  much  older;  as  a  matter  of  fact,  it  had  emerged,  though  without  an  official
nomination, at the time when both natural philosophers and subsequently natural scien‐
tists had began to use the term “species” (“eidos”) to describe the diversity of both or‐
ganisms and other things. Current attitude toward this problem varies from its ignoring
by practicing biologists  to its  explicit  fixation in theoretical  studies as  a  particular  theo‐
retical  construct  built  upon  the  species  notion.  Not  a  once  biologists  and  philosophers
participating in  the  discussion of  this  problem tried to  offer  their  understanding of  the
species  as  more  or  less  radical  and more  or  less  general  solutions  of  the  species  prob‐
lem. But each of them appeared eventually proved to be more or less particular and not
deciding but  just  supplementing the  problem and thus  making it  far  more “problemat‐
ic”. So the species problem in biology seems to be doomed to remain eternal as a conse‐
quence of  fundamentally  irremovable  disputability  and ambiguity of  the very notion of
the species.
In  this  chapter,  I  draw  attention  to  some  key  issues  of  the  species  problem  as  it  is
seemed  to  me  now.  First,  I  shall  try  to  delineate  somehow  what  precisely  might  be
called  the  “species  problem”  and  to  identify  its  origins,  both  historical  and  cognitive.
Second, I  shall  present possible scientific and philosophical contexts of its analysis,  with
emphasis  on  the  non-classical  philosophy of  science.  Third,  I  shall  consider,  within  the
latter  philosophy,  a  possible  natural  science  context  of  the  consideration  of  the  species
problem represented in the form of a “conceptual pyramid”, a part of which is the spe‐
cies notion as a theoretical construct. At last, it will be shown that another “radical solu‐
tion”  of  the  species  problem  may  be  just  to  acknowledge  objective  multiplicity  of  the
“kinds of  species”  of  living beings,  corresponding to  which is  subjective  multiplicity  of
the species concepts.
2. Whence the species problem
Any cognitive  problem is  systemic  by  its  nature,  and the  species  problem provides  no
exception.  It  is  structured,  multifaceted,  multi-component,  with  the  issues  of  different
levels of generality and significance interacting within it. These issues appear and disap‐
pear with the development of the problem, which, in its turn, is caused by development
of  the  scientific  discipline  in  which  it  has  been  subsisting.  In  particular,  taxonomic  as‐
pect  of  consideration of  the  species  problem was dominating previously,  while  its  “de‐
taxonomization”  is  noticeable  at  the  present  time,  according  to  which  the  “species  in
classification” becomes separated from the “species in nature” and it  is the latter that is
now being  considered  as  a  focal  point  of  the  species  problem [9-11].  Respectively,  dis‐
cussion  of  this  problem  should  begin  with  consideration  of  the  following  key  issues:
What  is the species problem? Why is it about just the species? Why is it just the problem?
[10, 12-13].
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2.1. What is the species problem
Generally speaking, any problem is generated by a cognitive issue that has no clear-cut sin‐
gle answer, and this is true for the species problem. The latter is a consequence of the above-
stressed irremovable ambiguity of the species notion (in its general biological sense), which
means impossibility to give an exhaustive comprehensive theoretical definition of the spe‐
cies as a biological phenomenon. This is referred to as the “species uncertainty” [14-15].
I think, however, that ambiguity of the species concept in itself is not the whole problem. Its
important (maybe the core) part seems to be a contradiction between polysemy of the spe‐
cies notion and unsuccessful striving of discussants to reduce it to a single most general (or
at least most appropriate) definition common to the entire biology.
An aspiration for a unified comprehension and definition of the species is quite understand‐
able; every science must have some unified thesaurus, through which the subject area of that
science is uniformly described. From such a perspective, usage of some common term for a
certain natural phenomenon—in our particular case, for a manifestation of diversity of or‐
ganisms—implies that the phenomenon in question is endowed with a unique property,
which allows to recognize it among other phenomena of the “same kind”. Therefore, the his‐
tory of the species problem appeared to be largely a story of searches for such a fundamen‐
tal overall property of the species (“specieshood”, see 5), which could be adequately
reflected in a single definition.
The species problem, in such a general meaning, emerged simultaneously with the very no‐
tion of species (= eidos) in the Ancient times, where it initially had quite different interpreta‐
tions (see 2.2). In the scholastic period, this ambiguity has been reduced to a logical
interpretation of the species. In modern times, however, dominated became biological un‐
derstanding of the species as a group of organisms, which diverse interpretations are cur‐
rently being tried to reduce to its evolutionary or genetic (reproductive) or operational
meanings. Another contemporary attempt, if not to reduce but at least to put diverse treat‐
ments in some order, is to build a kind of “conceptual pyramid” of different levels of gener‐
ality of these treatments (see 4.1).
One of the key issues that shapes contemporary understanding of the species problems con‐
cerns explanation of emergence of both the species (in the general sense) as a natural phe‐
nomenon and actual diversity of its manifestations. I think that there cannot be any properly
developed theory of the species (whatever might it be) without putting and answering these
fundamental questions.
2.2. Why the species
Fundamental status of the species concept has deep historical roots, without reference to
which one can hardly understand the reasons for such a great attention paid both to the spe‐
cies proper and to the species problem under consideration.
In a  very rough approximation (for  details,  see  [2,  16-17],  the history of  the term “spe‐
cies” dominating nowadays in biology goes back to the Aristotelian notion of “eidos” de‐
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noting certain “form” through which the formless “matter” assumes its actual existence.
So,  the “species” (= “eidos” = “form”) such treated was “external” with respect to the
“matter”,  which is  evident,  for  instance,  from Theophrastos’  concept  of  plants  changing
their “species” due to changes of conditions of their growth [18]. Under this naturphilo‐
sophical doctrine, the actual existence of any natural body is impossible without respec‐
tive  “eidos”  making  the  thing  what  it  is.  This  ontology  had  been  supplemented  by  a
cognitive construct called later “genus-species scheme” by neo-Platonists and scholastics,
in which the “eidos”=”species” got rather logical status of one of the universal categories
of  knowledge.  According  to  this  integrated  onto-epistemological  construct,  the  “ei‐
dos”=”species”  is  universal  and  fundamental  in  both  to  the  Nature  itself  and  to  the
knowledge  about  the  Nature.  Therefore,  nothing  can  exist  without  the  species,  be  it  a
body in the objective world or its image inferred within the logical generic-species subjec‐
tive scheme. This led to a strong belief of earlier Aristotle interpreters formulated explicit‐
ly  by  Boethius  that  “[if]  we do  not  know what  is  the  species,  nothing  would  secure  us  from
misunderstandings” (translated from the Russian edition [19]).
Strictly speaking, it is this Ancient historical and cognitive landmark from which it is rea‐
sonable to trace the above “eidology” with its presumption of universality and fundamen‐
tality of the species, whatever its particular interpretation may be, and all that is associated
with it. Searching for a “final answer” to the question “What is the species?” gave birth to
some “Boethian tradition”. It was brought to biology by Aristotelian A. Cesalpino having
first applied explicitly generic-species scheme to classification of botanical objects. Subse‐
quently, it was filled in part with the biological content by J. Ray, and then fixed by Lin‐
naeus, for whom it was the species that was the basic unit of the Natural System. So, past
and present theoreticians, having tried and still trying to answer somehow the above ques‐
tion, were and still are “Boethians”, as they were and still are believing this issue is one of
the most fundamental in biology.
Possible answers to that “Boethian question” have been being traditionally sought most of‐
ten in the framework of the dichotomy preset by neo-Platonists and early scholastics in the
form of opposition of realism vs. nominalism [13, 20-22]. Commitment to the realism re‐
quires acknowledge of the species objectively and undoubtedly existing as a kind of funda‐
mental and universal “unit of Nature”. Nominalists deny objectivity (reality) of the species
in the sense just indicated, or at least do not recognize its particular fundamental status in
the hierarchy of the Nature (bionominalism, see [11]), though acknowledge necessity and
universality of the species as a useful “unit of classification”.
Discussants, even belonging to opposite research schools, can quite agree with each other in
recognition of fundamental status of the above “Boethian question”, whatever its particular
answer might be. For instance, both “methodist” Linnaeus and “naturalist” Buffon (in his
later years) believed in objective (real) status of the species as a universal and fundamental
“unit of the Nature”. On the other hand, evolutionist Darwin, rejecting alongside with logi‐
cian J. Bentham distinctiveness of the species as a fundamental taxonomic and eventually
natural category, called however his famous book just “The Origin of Species...”, and not of
races or of something like that.
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One of peculiar manifestations of the “Boethian tradition”, I  think, is an exaggerated at‐
tention to the species category displayed by many biologists who use to pay too much at‐
tention to it.  Due to this,  other aspects of  the biological  diversity,  both “vertical” (e.g.
supraspecific groups) and “horizontal” (e.g. ecomorphs), are usually treated as of secon‐
dary  importance.  This  standpoint  seems  to  be  obsolete  with  regard  to  modern  under‐
standing  of  biodiversity,  but  it  nevertheless  still  persists  in  contemporary  biology  thus
impoverishing the overall picture of the biodiversity [23].
2.3. Why the problem
A brief answer to this question was given above (see 2.1); the problem is that the notion
of species, which has become fundamental for biology due to, among others, its “histori‐
cal  burden”,  cannot  be  filled  with  a  single  content  [12,  17,  22].  It  has  many meanings,
which  cannot  be  reduced to  a  single,  albeit  rather  complicated,  formula  such  as  “  The
species is...”.
An ambiguity of the species notion has as deep historical roots as this notion itself. It has
been originally used to refer to essentially different phenomena, some of which belonged
to the actual  diversity of  organisms,  while others to the ways this  diversity was descri‐
bed. And this is one of the main sources of the species problem.
Thus, Aristotle understood the “eidos” as both the groups of organisms (e.g. “tetrapods”)
and the essential properties characterizing them (e.g. “tetrapodness”). Such “dual” (from the
modern standpoint) usage of the same term “eidos” was quite natural to the Ancient under‐
standing of the Nature as the “Physis” and understanding of the species (eidos) as the
“form” shaping the matter [24] (see 2.2). This standpoint was partially preserved in the natu‐
ral history at least until the 16th century (occurred in J. Ray’s writings, see [25]. However,
these two aspects of the Ancient understanding of the species (eidos), as a taxon or as a mer‐
on, are recognized in the modern biology as fundamentally different, so their joining under
the same term became removed by separation of two aspects, taxonomic and meronomic, of
the organismal diversity [26]. Accordingly, taxonomically treated “eidos” became fixed as
the species, while its meronomic treatment provides the notion of homologue.
Further, although Aristotle distinguished terminologically between “natural” and “logical”
groups and seemed to use the term “eidos” only to designate the second ones [16], scholasti‐
cism united them under the single Latin term “species”. It has not probably been without
influence of Thomism, as one of its key ideas related to the topic under discussion was asser‐
tion of the unity of three “hypostases” of the essences—before things (ante res), within things
(in rebus), and after things (post res)—as different aspects of the same universal organizing
principle of the world of both things and ideas. Modern natural science recognizes a necessi‐
ty of handling the “natural species” separately from the “logical species” [10, 11, 12, 13, 27],
but this is not yet reflected properly in the existing thesaurus of “eidology”. And this also
contributes to the problematic situation; obviously, any discussion of ontological status of
the species becomes meaningless if it is not indicated explicitly what kind of “species”, natu‐
ral or logical, is referred to (see also 3.4).
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An important source of the species problem, in its general sense, is the multidimensional
nature of the “species in nature” understood also in its general sense.  It  means that the
species a)  is  a  member of  different natural  processes,  and b)  it  possess its  own internal
structure of different kind. Every aspect of the species natural history (e.g.  genealogical,
ecological, reproductive, etc.) can be fixed in the form of its key (essential) property to be
used for elaborating certain species concept,  which is advocated by its authors and pro‐
ponents as a “principal” one. An aspiration for ascribing a universal meaning of the spe‐
cies to such particular concepts and, accordingly, the belittling of other concepts leads to
competition  between  them,  which  however  can  be  inconsistent  under  certain  circum‐
stance (see 5.2).
A particular  aspect  of  the  species  multidimensionality  and thus  of  the  species  problem
became apparent relatively recently; it  is the necessity for separate consideration of “the
species  taxon  problem”  and  “the  species  category  problem” [16,  28-29].  In  the  terms
adopted here, the species category is defined by the specieshood, while the species taxon
is  (quite  roughly)  defined  by  particular  manifestation  of  the  specieshood  in  particular
groups of organisms.
One of the sources of the species problem is that biologists (and occasionally philosophers)
put quite different questions analyzing the species concepts and their applications; this was
noticed repeatedly by many authors [9, 10, 12, 13, 16, 22, 30-34]. Some of these questions are
about essential properties of the species (i.e. about the above mentioned “specieshood”),
others deal with the mechanisms of emergence and sustainable subsistence of the species,
and more others consider how to recognize particular species in the empirical studies. In
this regard, the species problem is quite comparable to the homology problem or to the gene
problem; in each of them, respective unit, though uniformly called (the species, the homo‐
logue, the gene, respectively), are recognized and treated much differently in particular re‐
search programs.
Pretty curious seems to be a kind of “psychological” source of the species problem, i.e. con‐
viction of the debate participants that this problem does actually exist [35]. Due to this, the
species problem takes certain kind of independence and self-sufficiency as a particular con‐
ceptual construct interested mainly to some theoreticians.
It is important to bear in one’s mind that the species problem is a dynamic construct. It has
been developing in parallel with development of both the natural science and the philoso‐
phy of science, responding one or another way to the new ideas elaborated by them. Ac‐
cordingly, the content of the problem has been changing with time; some of its aspects fallen
away, some came as new ones to gain particular attention. One of the most important recent
changes was due to completing the above rigid dichotomy between “realism vs. nominal‐
ism” to a trichotomy by adding a modern version of the conceptualism to them [10, 27, 36].
The latter brings its own focus to the general species problem, which allows to take a fresh
look at the multidimensional nature of the species proper and to legitimizes the “species
pluralism” (see 3.1).
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3. Understanding species: Cognitive situation
One of the most important in the contemporary cognitive science is the notion of cognitive
situation, within which object, subject, purpose, and means of knowledge are determined.
Understanding of its content and structure was changing considerably with the evolution of
philosophy of science. The most significant shift occurred in the second half of the 20th cen‐
tury in connection with transition from the classical to the non-classical scientific paradigm
[37]. The latter evidently, albeit it is not fully acknowledged yet, affects understanding of the
entire species problem [10].
3.1. Classical vs. non-classical views of the species
Classical science is based on the following key assumptions. The Universe is organized
(structured) by a single principle; the structure of the Universe is therefore linear and admits
a reduction of its diversity to a minimum (“atomic”) level; the unity of the Universe as a
global natural phenomenon is reflected in the unity of a “final theory” describing it; it is
comprehended by means of a unified general method (in its broadest sense, i.e. Organon).
This general idea, in its natural philosophy version, is rooted in the Biblical worldview, ac‐
cording to which the Universe arose as a result of realization of the unified plan of Divine
creation, and none other that Linnaeus wrote that “Natura est lex Dei” (see [38]). In the positi‐
vist version of the classical science, emphasis is made not on the unity of the Universe ori‐
gin, but just on the method of its cognition; it is acknowledged that “the world is simple and
allows as a simple description” following some unified protocol (R. Carnap). This general
position is known as the onto-epistemological monism.
With respect to the species issues, monistic position, in its extreme form, is expressed in the
recognition of the species as a universal unit of organization of the living matter, which exis‐
tence does not require any proof [2]. Accordingly, there can be only one “true” species con‐
cept (or theory) describing (and eventually explaining) this universal phenomenon by
means of some universal theory. In a more moderate version, which recognizes validity of
different concepts, it means a possibility to elaborate finally an “ideal” [39], or a “primary”
[40-42], or a “universal” [43] species concept, in relation to which other concepts, though lo‐
cally true, have a subordinate (secondary, derivative) status. But it turns out that different
philosophical backgrounds leads to different understanding of which exactly species con‐
cept (theory) should be considered as “primary”. An emphasis on ontology leads to aspira‐
tion for as broad as possible biologically meaningful definition of the species. An emphasis
on epistemology presumes search of as wide as possible operational theory-neutral concept.
So, in some broadest perspective, any such candidates for a “universal” species concept pro‐
vide just some partial decisions of the overall species problem.
The non-classical scientific paradigm is based on acknowledging complexity of both the
Universe and of any of its components (fragments, aspects, levels, etc.), which are endowed
with some emergent properties and are ontologically irreducible to each other. This means a
fundamental impossibility of any kind of “universal theory of everything”; instead, different
components (fragments, aspects, etc.) of the Universe are described by different partial theo‐
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ries that do not compete with each other but are complementary [44]. A part of non-classical
paradigm is the modern conceptualism, according to which no empirical knowledge can ex‐
ist out of the context configured by an informal (content-wise) theory of certain level of gen‐
erality. The same is thought to be true for the method; a unified “Organon” (except for the
comparative method in its most general sense) is impossible, various mutually irreducible
components (fragments, aspects, etc.) of the Universe are described by particular methods
satisfying conditions of the relevant informal theories. Of essential importance is recognition
of irremovable presence of an “observer” in the cognitive situation; it is the cognizing sub‐
ject that chooses somehow what and how exactly should be investigated in the Universe.
This means fundamental impossibility of any kind of “absolutely objective” knowledge.
From this it follows the onto-epistemological pluralism, with respect to the species issues
meaning the following.
It is acknowledged, as an initial condition for analysis of the species problem, that (a) the
biota is objectively structured in multi-faceted and multi-level ways, (b) one of manifesta‐
tions of this structuredness is the subsistence of certain structural units, and (c) one of these
units is what is usually called the species. Further, it is recognized that, just like the biota
itself, the “species in Nature” understood in such a very general sense is by itself a complex
and multi-faceted phenomenon. Recognition of this “species unit” in its whatever manifesta‐
tions at the theoretical level is based on an informal (biologically meaningful) theory, which
provides some general criteria of what is the species as a natural phenomenon. Therefore,
any kind of theorizing about the species involves, by necessity, explicit fixation of some bio‐
logically meaningful context within which this natural phenomenon with its properties
(manifestations) should be considered. Different mutually irreducible manifestations of the
species are reflected in different species concepts which describe it in various ways and thus
are complementary to each other. Together, they constitute a kind of general conceptual
space as an “existential domain” of the species problem as a theoretical construct (see 3.2). It
is also acknowledged that any empirical species concepts (in particular, those based on the
similarity as such) are biologically sound only if they are correlated with certain biologically
meaningful (evolutionary, or ecological, or else) theoretical concept. And, at last, no empiri‐
cal identification of a particular “species in Nature” is possible without the above informal
concept defining the species at theoretical level, as it is just the meaningful theory that indi‐
cates to a researcher what and how to “see” (to research) in the Nature (A. Einstein).
3.2. Three-partitioned cognitive situation for the species problem
Cognitive situation [37] is, in general, three-partitioned; it includes objective (ontological),
epistemic and subjective components. The first component defines what to study, the second
defines how to study, and the third defines who studies. In the framework of classical and
non-classical paradigms, interrelations between these components are interpreted in signifi‐
cantly different ways.
In the classical science seeking for an “absolutely objective” knowledge by an “absolutely
objective” method, the mutual influence of the above three components is though to be
minimized. With this, the learning subject is “excluded” from the cognitive situation in or‐
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der to eliminate its influence on the results of the learning, so the entire situation is sup‐
posed to be two-partitioned, consisting of non-interrelated ontological and epistemic
components.
In the non-classical science, an irremovable presence and interaction of all the above three
components of cognitive situation is acknowledged, which means the following. The objec‐
tive component forming ontological basis of the species problem is construed taking into ac‐
count certain epistemological conditions (e.g. observability). Epistemic component, as a set
of principles and standards of studying the species issues, is formed, on the one hand, by a
subject of the cognitive activity and, on the other hand, should be adequate to the ontology
of the object (e.g. to its probabilistic nature). Subjective component in its most general sense
embraces the entire spectrum of the learning subject ranging from particular scholars to sci‐
entific communities formed around particular scientific paradigms (research programs). It is
the subject that captures, in some or other way, certain aspect of the biotic structure, in
which context it becomes meaningful to consider the species (in its general sense) as an ele‐
ment of that structure. This “capturing” is a kind of cognitive act that makes it possible to
identify the species in the cognitive situation as something liable to a theoretical comprehen‐
sion and empirical identification. And it is the learning subject that, after all, decides how to
define and to study that structure.
Each of these components exists in the cognitive situation by means of various concepts, def‐
initions and occasionally personal ideas fixing them some or other way. This means that
each cognitive situation involves a kind of “conceptualizing the world” [45] and therefore is
associated with certain “conceptual space” [46], outside of which it does not exist. Such a
“space” should be outlined as explicitly as possible; as a matter of fact, if some phenomenon
is not reflected in concepts and definitions (or at least does not appear as a part of personal
knowledge), then it is absent in the cognitive situation and cannot be reasonably investigat‐
ed. One of such conceptual spaces is built around the species notion and eventually the spe‐
cies problem. This space can generally be regarded as three-dimensional; its “cognitive
axes” correspond to the above three components of the cognitive situation. Such an under‐
standing of the latter allows to consider every partial species concept as a local area (sub‐
space) in that conceptual space, so its content can be properly and fully determined only by
its projecting onto all three axes of that space. In particular, the latter means that, say, evolu‐
tionary species should be apprehended not in an “absolute” sense as something uncondi‐
tionally existing in the Nature but as a particular aspect of the biota’s structure recognized
by a particular research community based on a particular theoretical concept.
With this way of considering particular species concepts, it is to be taken into account that
they can be “loaded” with each of the components in a different degree; or, in other words,
they can be projected onto corresponding axes of the conceptual space in different ways. In
this regard, it is important to emphasize that these axes, although intercorrelated because of
interaction of respective components of the cognitive situation, can be considered as “or‐
thogonal” in some utmost sense. Therefore, the species concepts, to the extent that they are
“loaded” with (projected onto) basically different axes, may have substantially different cog‐
nitive meaning, with some of them being primarily ontological (e.g. phylogenetic) while
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others being primarily epistemological (e.g. phenetic). Such way of viewing of the overall
conceptual space allows to stress that only the species concepts basically “loaded” with
(projected onto) the same “cognitive axis” may be considered as the items of the “same
kind”, and thus may compete with each other (for instance, evolutionary and phylogenetic
concepts). Contrary to this, species concepts basically “loaded” with (projected onto) differ‐
ent “cognitive axes” are not of the “same kind” and cannot compete directly in the given
conceptual space; the instances are theory-burden phylogenetic and theory-neutral phenetic
concepts. What compete actually under such a circumstance are not particular species con‐
cept but respective “cognitive axes” which are given more or less significance within the
frameworks of particular natural science philosophies.
Further structuring of the overall conceptual space of the species problem is an important
issue involving each of its “cognitive axes”. Thus, the object (ontological) axis includes, for
instance, ecological and phylogenetic aspects of subsistence of the “species in Nature”; or its
phenomenological (e.g. genealogy) and causal (e.g. reproductive mechanisms) aspects. The
epistemological axis includes, for instance, logical or mathematical foundations of the re‐
searches concerning the species subject. At last, the subject axis includes personal (intuitive)
or “collective” (paradigmal) attitude to the “species in Nature”. All this has a significant
relevance to consideration of certain conditions of comparability and “competibility” of the
species concepts considered elsewhere (see 5.2).
3.3. Species concept as an onto-epistemological model
In considering structure of the cognitive situation of the species problem, it is fundamentally
important to understand that its objective (ontological) component encompasses not infinite
objective reality (the Universe itself), but its finite model (representation) suitable for its han‐
dling as a theoretical construct. This model is given in a form of fixed concepts and defini‐
tions, it emerges as a result of some reduction operation, which is based on certain ideas of
what is essential and what is not for analysis of the species problem. First, the biota is “ex‐
tracted” from the Universe by breaking off some of its relationship with other components
of the Universe irrelevant to representation of the biota in terms of its own structure. Then
some structural units of the biota are singled out, one of which is designated as the species.
When considering these items, only those characteristics of the biotic structure become evi‐
dently included that are deemed relevant to the species problem. This sequential operation
of reduction is resulted in an onto-epistemological “species model” as a part of the objective
component of cognitive situation of the species problem.
Each such “species model” is a biologically meaningful theoretical construct, which in more
conventional terms is usually called the “species concept”. It provides an item that could be
properly denoted as the “species in theory”. As it can be seen from the foregoing, the latter
exists in the form of certain verbal definitions, which allow to distinguish the species from
other units in the biotic structure (e.g. macro-monophyletic groups, ecomorphs, discrete age
and sex groups, etc.). The combination of these definitions, as noted above, outlines the con‐
ceptual space of the species problem, and each onto-epistemological species model (concept)
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can be regarded as a local area of that space. In the terms adopted here, the less reducing is a
species model, the greater part of conceptual space is occupied by the respective area.
In Max Weber’s terms (see [47]), such an ontological species model can be interpreted as
an “ideal type” that fixes essential properties of what is perceived by a researcher as the
“species  in  Nature”  being  an  objective  natural  phenomenon.  Various  properties  are  re‐
garded as essential or nonessential under some biologically meaningful theory, which de‐
fines simultaneously (a)  particular consideration aspect of  the biotic  structure in general
and (b) the candidates “species in Nature” in particular.  It  is such a theory that gives a
reduction basis resulted into a particular ontological “species model” (this issue is consid‐
ered in some detail in one of the following sections, see 4.2). It is clear that the more re‐
ducing a model is, i.e. the more supposedly “nonessential” properties are dropped in its
design, the more distant it is from the “species in Nature” being modeled, so the poorer
and the more partial  is  it  in  its  content.  For  instance,  the genealogical  species  model  is
more reducing and less meaningful than the evolutionary one; there is “less” of the “spe‐
cies in Nature” in the former than in the latter.
It is clear that the ontological models are not the only possible. Epistemological models (con‐
cepts) figure along with them, which are construed with a minimum appeal to the objective
component of cognitive situation. These include various types of operational concepts
aimed at developing methods for identifying and describing some structural units by tradi‐
tion called the species. But, from the conceptualism standpoint, such models and respective
units they allow to recognize are biologically “empty” without reference to any and mean‐
ingful theory therefore cannot be related directly to the “species in Nature”. It is possible to
talk also about “subjective models” as manifestations of personal knowledge, i.e. of scien‐
tists’ intuitive images about how the biota is structured at the species level.
It should be emphasized that degree of reduction of the ontological species model (concept)
depends on degree of “meddling” of a subject (researcher) into the cognitive situation. As it
was pointed out above, it is the subject that decides, which of the relations of the “species in
Nature” with its “Umgebung” are to be omitted in order to make the “species in theory”
meeting certain epistemological criteria, for example, to make it more operational. It is seen
from this that the more reducing the ontological species model (concept) is due to its opera‐
tionalization, the less of objective and more of subjective components is embedded in it.
From this viewpoint, for example, definition of the species as a phylogroup is more “subjec‐
tive” (in the sense just indicated) than its evolutionary definition. At best, such reducing
models can be more appropriate, under conditions of operationalism, as “intersubjective”
(in the sense of Popper), which does not indispensably implies they are more “objective”.
There can be quite a lot of ways of reducing cognitively infinite Universe to particular onto‐
logical biota models and of further reducing the latter to some finite ontological species
models. The potential number of such reducing models are just as many as informal theories
of the biotic structure can be elaborated to infer essential criteria for construing the species
models (presumably, they are not infinitely numerous). Any such finite “species in theory”,
as noted above, is necessarily a reducing partial representation of cognitively inexhaustible
multidimensional “species in Nature”. This means that certain natural phenomenon denot‐
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ed by the “species” notion, in its most general understanding, may be represented by a
number of partial ontological species models (concepts). This serves as a prerequisite for the
“species pluralism” from the very beginning of construing the species problem at the onto‐
logical level.
In a more general and a more formal sense, each of the theories serving as reducing base for
elaborating particular species models (concepts) can be considered as a “possible world” in
sense of Kripke. Each of these worlds is defined by a variable (or a set of variables), which
are treated as most significant for understanding and defining the species, be they genealogi‐
cal, ecological, ethological or any other possible consideration. This formalism might be of
use from a semantic standpoint in considering definitions and naming different “kinds of
species” (see 5.2). Besides, from a more practical viewpoint, it allows to distinguish, in some
informal way, “good” and “bad” species, with the former being uniformly recognized in dif‐
ferent “possible worlds” defined by different variables [10].
In the analysis of objective component of the cognitive situation within the non-classical sci‐
entific paradigm, one of theoretically meaningful issues in the species problem becomes the
determination of not competitive relations between the onto-epistemological species models
(concepts) but the conditions of their mutual interpretability, i.e. of translation of statements
of one concept into those of another with minimal loss of information. Obviously, the great‐
er is overlap of the areas in the general conceptual space corresponding to different species
models (concepts), the more they are mutually interpretable. This standpoint makes cogni‐
tive situation of the species problem more clearly structured and allows a more accurate
solving of practical tasks of comparison of particular species classifications based on differ‐
ent onto-epistemological models (concepts).
3.4. Species as “one of the many”
In the classical tradition, the species is considered a priori  as a basic unit of the Natural
System (see  2.2).  This  tradition is  continued by the  modern concept  of  biodiversity,  ac‐
cording to which the species is the latter’s basic unit [48]. But if the Natural System had a
naturphilosophical  status  of  the  universal  “law of  Nature”,  in  which the species  took a
unique place (see “Philosophy of Botany” of Linnaeus), the biodiversity is merely an epi‐
phenomenon of  some fundamental  property  of  the  biota,  namely  of  its  structure.  I  be‐
lieve that,  in modern biology, it  is  the biotic structure,  and not some Natural System of
naturphilosophy,  that  should be represented by certain informal  model  in  the cognitive
situation of  the  species  problem.  The implications  of  this  substitution is  that  this  struc‐
ture is not only multi-level, but also multifold, with the species can be seen as just “one
of the many” units of this structure [23].
The currently dominating paradigm of biodiversity (or rather, of the biotic structure) im‐
plies that the latter is subdivided into two internested hierarchies, phylogenetic and ecologi‐
cal [49]. At the same time it is presumed that they are obviously not completely independent
of each other but are, as a matter of fact, just mutually irreducible aspects of the single struc‐
tured biota.
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Phylogenetic  aspects  of  the  biotic  structure  corresponds  to  the  multi-level  phylogenetic
pattern in which the species is “one of the many” monophyletic groups of different lev‐
els of  generality.  This viewpoint was anticipated by those biologists  of  the 19th century
who rejected fundamental status of the species as a unit of either classification or evolu‐
tion (see  2.2),  this  idea is  currently  reflected in  designation of  the  species,  according to
the  phylogenetic  species  concept,  as  a  phylospecies  or  cladospecies  or  just  as  a  phy‐
logroup [50-52].
Ecological aspect of the biotic structure corresponds to the hierarchy of ecosystems, with its
own basic structural units (elements). Within this general conception, it is possible to fix
ecospecis at some level of ecological hierarchy defined by its position in the niche structure
of local communities [53-55]. However, there is another approach do describing community
structure, which basic unit is the ecomorph, i.e. an array of organisms characterized by unity
of ecological and morphological characters, irrespective of their phylogenetic history [56-57].
These ecomorphs may, for example, be age stages in organisms with “discrete” ontogeny
(like larvae and imagoes in insects with complete metamorphosis), or gender groups per‐
forming different functions in the ecosystems (like mosquito’s males and females), or occa‐
sionally castes in the social insects. In the terms of ecological structure, all these units are
equivalent in the sense they take some comparable fixed positions in the hierarchy of eco‐
systems. In this perspective, the species in its “local” interpretation (as “non-dimensional
species” of Mayr) is just “one of the many” of such ecomorphs. Indeed, it presumably does
not matter for some waterfowl community, if respective ecological niches are occupied by
different species of aquatic and terrestrial predatory insects or by larval and imago stages of
the same dragonfly species.
The above consideration allows to emphasize that the species as a unit of the biotic structure
is not an a priori given “basic” natural phenomenon, which is obligatory “the same” (in a
sense) in all hierarchies of the biotic structure. It is just one of several manifestations (as‐
pects) of that structure, so it is not the “species” but a “species unit”, which is fixed somehow
by a subject of the cognitive situation based on some ontological model (theory) of the biota.
The latter model includes, as its part, indication of certain essential characteristics and pa‐
rameters (structural, functional, temporal, etc.) that allow to fix certain units of the biotic
structure (biodiversity), among which there might be the “species unit” in question. It is evi‐
dent that various ontological models fitting certain research programs may presume various
ways of fixation of the latter unit. In one case, it will be a phylospecies, in another — ecospe‐
cies, in the third — biospecies, etc. Taking into account the above ideas of the conceptual
space, these units coincide to the extent that the parameters of the “species models” fixing
them overlap in that space.
Such a theoretical (cognitive) determination of the ways of fixation of the “species units” of
the biotic structure leads to a conclusion that the aforementioned “species pluralism” (see
3.1) is actually unavoidable. Moreover, its inevitable extension (hopefully asymptotic) can
be assumed because of supposed progressive complication of the concepts of the biotic
structure including causes and principles of its organization, functioning and evolution.
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3.5. In what senses are the species “real”?
Within an intersection of the ontological and epistemological components of cognitive situa‐
tion of the species problem (see 3.2), theoretical issues concerning the species “modes of be‐
ing” are most important. One of these involves ontology of the “species units”, which
consideration is based on certain epistemic criteria of the species reality.
Approaches to solve this issue—or rather this problem, because it does not have any unique
trivial solution—has being been discussed in a great amount of literature since the neo-Pla‐
tonists (see 2.2). Previously, it most often was considered in the context of the classical scien‐
tific philosophical paradigm, according to which the species are either “real” in the sense
that they exist objectively in the Nature (position of realism), or “unreal” being just outputs
of some cognitive activity (position of nominalism).
Within the non-classical onto-epistemology, which important part is the contemporary con‐
ceptualism (see 3.1), diversity of the very “reality” is acknowledged; by this, I mean not the
above S. Kripke's plural “possible worlds”, but the “three worlds” in sense of K. Popper
[58]. According to the latter, the “first world” corresponds to the objective reality, this is
what exists “in fact” outside an observer. The “second world” corresponds to the subjective
reality in consciousness (and unconsciousness) of a researcher, which is composed of subjec‐
tive images reflecting what exists (or occasionally does not) “in fact”. The “third world” (or
a substantial part of it) corresponds to the theoretical reality, that is to the conceptual space
in which the species problem is considered.
It is evident that those “three worlds” of Popper correspond to a degree to the three basic
components of cognitive situation or, what is almost the same, to the “axes” of the conceptu‐
al space outlined above (see 3.1). From this it follows that the issue of the species reality as a
part of the respective problem gains a particular emphasis; the question of whether the spe‐
cies is real or not should be raised with taking into account existence of those different reali‐
ties. So this question becomes complete if only certain “cognitive axis” is indicated, as well.
The “species in Nature” possess a reality which is used to be denoted as an objective. The
“species in theory” is also “real”, but its reality is different, it is that of a theoretical construct
within the overall conceptual space. To a researcher, his/her own ideas of the species are
part of his/her mental subjective reality, so it is also “real” in a peculiar manner. Thus, all
these “species” existing in different Popperian “worlds”, are obviously “real” in their own
ways, though their realities are of essentially different ontology—and this is another aspect
of the “species pluralism”. With this perspective of considering species “realities”, one of the
key issues is to establish a correspondence between all of them.
In this regard, the “species in classification” deserves close attention. Classification can be
considered as a model (representation) of some aspect of the structure of biological diversi‐
ty, so it can be attributed with some reservations to the “third world” of Popper. But this is
not a theoretical reality in its strict sense; rather, the “species in classification” is a judgment
(hypothesis) about the “species in Nature” put forward on the basis of some data at hands
within the scientific context provided by particular “species in theory”. Thus, the “species in
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classification” is a kind of connecting link between all three “species realities” allowing to
set a required correspondence between them.
3.6. Cognitive styles
The subjective component of cognitive situation is multidimensional and multilevel, like its
other basic components. In referring to it in the non-classical theory of science, attention is
most often paid to division of overall scientific community into research schools adhered to
particular paradigms (research programs). This implies a particular theoretical interpreta‐
tion of empirical data by members of this community according to a particular theoretical
construct underlying respective paradigm (research program). This is, that is to say, an “ap‐
parent” non-personal manifestation of the subjective component. Relevance of this “para‐
digm effect” to the present issue is quite obvious; every sufficiently general species concept
(biological, phenetic, phylogenetic, etc.) serves as a core for the formation of a particular
paradigm (or is a part of respective research program). Therefore, this level of organization
of the subjective component is considered in a lot of publications and so is hardly worth be‐
ing discussed here any longer.
Much less attention is drawn to a lower level of the subjective component corresponding to
the individual cognitive styles underlying researchers’ personal (tacit) knowledge [59, 60].
These styles are responsible for forming an array of the Popperian “third worlds”. Cognitive
(thinking) styles are implied by researchers’ way of perception of the world, they are diverse
and multifaceted, can be ordered (in the simplest case) in pairs of opposites [61]. Examples
include researchers’ inclination for holistic or reduction vision of the whole biota and any of
its structural elements, for intuitive or rational way of knowledge, etc. A pair of opposites
“typological vs. population” thinking styles is known to be quite relevant to the species
problem [62-63].
In the framework of contrasting classical and non-classical scientific paradigms (see 3.1), of
special significance is the pair of “discrete vs. fuzzy” thinking, which corresponds evidently
to the dichotomy of “discrete vs. fuzzy” logic [64]. The principal meaning of fuzzy thinking
is that it frees a researcher from having to look for the sharp edges where they cannot in
principle be drawn. “Splitting” phyletic lineages into fragments corresponding to the “verti‐
cal species” of paleontologists is an example of situations where such a thinking style is
more than relevant. Another typical example is the interspecies hybridization; if it is not
widespread in nature and not absorptive, it does not preclude recognition of the species sta‐
tus of respective units. In both these cases, the species are treated as “fuzzy” entities, contra‐
ry to the provisions of “xenotaxonomy” (in sense of [65]). This “fuzzy” term was suggested
for a particular case of prokaryote species [66- 67], but it certainly deserves more wide treat‐
ment just outlined [10, 68]. Finally, this style allows to see not so dramatically the entire sit‐
uation with the “species pluralism”; at least some of the ontological species models
(concepts) are not exclusive but overlap and complement each others due to their having
certain conceptual constructs in common, so, in a sense, these concepts are not “discrete”
but “fuzzy”.
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4. Defining species: Conceptual pyramid
Any sufficiently advanced theoretical construct (theory, concept, etc.) is organized in a con‐
ceptual pyramid, which is caused by certain reason of logical nature.
According to the classical theory of definitions [69], each notion can be sufficiently strictly
defined only within the above mentioned logical genus-species scheme (see 2.2). This means
that (a) each particular notion must be related as a “logical species” to a more general notion
as its “logical genus” and (b) within the latter, several “logical species” should be distin‐
guished as the latter’s partial notions, so that any each of them can be properly defined only
with reference to its counterparts within the same “logical genus”. Therefore, in order to de‐
fine the species as a natural phenomenon, it is necessary to define, first, that natural phe‐
nomenon which notion can be considered as a “logical genus” for the biologically
meaningful species notion and, second, those natural phenomena, which notions can serve,
along with the species notion, as different “logical species” within the given “logical genus”
properly defined.
Similar though less formal hierarchical scheme of definitions is implied by well-known Göd‐
el's incompleteness theorem. Elaborated initially as purely mathematical, in its more general
epistemological interpretation [70-71] it affirms that any theory (concept) cannot be exhaus‐
tively defined in the terms of the language of this theory (concept) itself. For such a defini‐
tion to be properly construed, a kind of meta-language is required, which belongs to a
theory (concept) of higher level of generality (“logical genus”), with respect to which the
given notion is its partial interpretation (“logical species”).
All the above has a direct bearing on the analysis of logical structure and content of the spe‐
cies problem. First of all, both argumentation schemes imply that species concepts should be
arranged in a kind of “conceptual pyramid” of various levels of generality, with the most
general concepts belonging to the “tip” of the pyramid and the least general ones being
placed at its base. “Pyramidal” shape of the resulting structure is due to the fact that, at each
level of generality, partial concepts are evidently more numerous than more general (inclu‐
sive) ones. Next, each species concept of lower generality level gains its substantiation only
within the context provided by the concept of higher generality level. At last, what is quite
important, such a “pyramidal” construction of the entire species problem means that within
the species concept(s) proper, even of the highest generality level, the very notion of species
cannot be well defined.
4.1. Pyramid(s) of the species concepts
There more than 20 species concepts are currently recognized [16, 17, 41, 72-74]; as it was
pointed out (see 2.1), such a multiplicity is one of the core aspects of the species problem.
Each of these concepts provides its own species definition (although not quite strict in most
cases), based on a particular understanding of what are essential properties constituting the
key parameter of the “specieshood”.
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Several classifications of the species concepts and definitions of different levels of generality
were elaborated for ordering such a multiplicity of concepts. The latter are grouped in each
of these classifications according to the parameters that are taken as the most important by
respective authors for ordering the concepts. This appeared to be resulted in several hier‐
archical arrangements of the species concepts, with their amount reflecting number of the
bases (ordering parameters), which can be fixed for classifying those concepts. This gives
rise to a peculiar aspect of the species problem, now it is not diversity of the concepts prop‐
er, but of their classifications.
In one of the earlier versions of such conceptual pyramids, recognition of “primary” and
“secondary” species concepts was proposed [40-41]. This implies that the primary concepts
include more characteristics of the species than the secondary, so the former are more gener‐
al and less in number while the latter are their partial interpretation and thus are more nu‐
merous. In a sense, this idea is similar to that of Gilmour [75] who suggested to recognize
“general purpose” (primary) and “special purpose” (secondary) classifications. In the just
mentioned Mayden’s [41] classification, evolutionary species concept is referred to as the
primary, because it actually is one of the most inclusive in its content. However, a systemic
consideration of the species [9, 10, 76], though not explicitly formulated as a concept (see be‐
low), provides its even more general treatment, so it is the latter that can claim to be the pri‐
mary, indeed, for this particular conceptual pyramid.
In another, more general approach to elaborating classifications of such kind, one of the
most important grounds giving fundamentally different conceptual pyramids, I believe,
might be consideration of the species in accordance to the ways they are considered within
the conceptual space.
One such classification presumes distinguishing among concepts corresponding to either
ontological or epistemological considerations of the species [77]. As it was mentioned above
(see 3.2), they can be considered as different “projections” of the general species concept on‐
to different “axes” of the conceptual space, so they may be considered as equivalent in this
respect. The former are theoretically laden and give an idea of what is the species as a natu‐
ral phenomenon (evolutionary, genealogical, reproductive, etc.). The latter are theory-neu‐
tral and indicate how to distinguish particular species whatever might be their theoretical
foundations (operational taxonomic unit, minimal recognizable unit, etc.). However, from
the conceptualism standpoint addressed to ontology (see 3.1), such a hierarchy cannot be
considered as well established, because, in biology as a natural history science, formal op‐
erational concepts cannot function as sound scientific constructs outside the context given
by biologically meaningful informal concepts. Attributing them an equal status (rank in the
conceptual pyramid) yields a biased view of the entire species problem as it implies substi‐
tution of theoretical issues about meaningful species definitions by elaborating facilities for
practical species identifications [10, 33, 39, 41, 74, 78]. Within the above hierarchy of the “pri‐
mary” and “secondary” species concepts, operational ones are nothing more than “tertiary”
ones belonging to the lowest level of the conceptual pyramid.
Close to the previous one by its meaning is a division of the species concepts reflecting their
belonging to the “first” and the “third” worlds of Popper (see 3.4), which are the “species in
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Nature” and the “species in theory” (or maybe the "species in classification”). Proponents of
this division offer to use the term “species” to designate a unit of taxonomic classification,
while natural units (populations) are to be denoted by some different terms [11, 79-81]; this
idea goes back to Aristotle, see 2.3).
Another type of classification of the species concepts by general onto-epistemological cri‐
terion is a hotly debated interpretation of the species (in general sense) as a class, or as a
cluster,  or  as  a  historical  group,  or  as  a  individual  (see 5.2).  Such a classification by its
content may be, with some reservations, considered as not actually biological but rather
philosophical [39].
In the classification of species concepts elaborated on the basis of biologically meaningful
criteria, a distinguish is made between diachronic and synchronic or, which is nearly the
same, between historical and structural groups of concepts [82]. The former are evolutionary
concepts, including the phylogenetic one, while the latter include, for example, typological
and reproductive (genetic) concept. Recognition of structural and processual concepts [13] is
close to this categorization; to them I would add a functional (ecological) group of concepts.
Some classification can be elaborated on the basis of what is taken as the principal parame‐
ter of the “specieshood” to be used for a theoretical species definition; this gives the follow‐
ing principal groups of the species concepts [17].
• the species as a similarity-based commonality unites such concepts as typological, phenet‐
ic, genetic, all presuming sharing particular traits by the species; also commonality of on‐
togenetic processes shared by conspecifics [83] and homeostatic property cluster concept
[84] can be mentioned here;
• the species as a reproductive commonality summarizes generational and biological (in the
narrow sense, i.e. “reproductive”) concepts; fitting this category is also recognition con‐
cept [85-86], where emphasis is made not on the isolation, but on the integration, the latter
gives the cohesion concept [87];
• the species as a historic commonality, these are phylogenetic, or genealogical concepts in
both general and various partial interpretations;
• the species as a evolutionary commonality of both historical origin and peculiar “evolu‐
tionary role” of conspecifics;
• the species as a particular ecological commonality according to the ecospecies concept, or
to the functional concept of Khlebosolov [88]. It is to be mentioned that biosystematics
was the first to have developed a detailed hierarchy and nomenclature of ecologically
treated “species units” in parallel to the taxonomic “Linnaean species” [53, 89];
• the species as a systemic unit [76] including its treatment as an element of the biota being
a non-equilibrium system [9, 10, 23].
In discussion of the pyramid of the species concepts itself, one of the principal question is,
whether it is possible to elaborate something like an “ideal” species concept, which would
include in its definition all manifestations of the species units existing in the biological na‐
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ture [10, 39, 41, 90-91]. The aforementioned evolutionary species was a suggested candidate
for such a concept, as it is characterized by combination of evolutionary, genetic and occa‐
sionally ecological parameters [41, 92]. A more general definition of the species as a structur‐
al unit of the biota considered as evolving non-equilibrium system should also be
mentioned in this respect. One of the promising ideas seemingly never discussed before can
be an elaboration of a kind of general “framework concept” [93]; it provides a meaningful
interpretation of the conceptual space and formulates biologically sound conditions, under
which particular species concepts of different levels of generality can be inferred.
4.2. An “ultimate beginner” for the species concepts
Any of the conceptual pyramids of the species problem, in the ways of their construing con‐
sidered in the previous section, remains closed on itself. However, in the terms of the above
genus-species scheme supplemented with epistemologically interpreted incompleteness the‐
orem (see 4), any kind of the “species pyramid” should be built into a concept (theory) of the
next higher level of generality. The latter is designed to serve as a “logical genus” for any of
“ideal” or “universal” species concepts as its partial “logical species”. This provides a possi‐
bility to fix such a content-wise consideration context of the entire species problem, in which
the most basic questions of the species theory (which is still absent) becomes meaningful;
what is the species as a unit of the biotic structure, how it differs from other such units, why
and how it emerged, and finally what (if any) is the species level of this organization.
Of the existing theories, which can serve as something like “superstructure” over the con‐
ceptual pyramid of the species problem, two have been most often being discussed for deca‐
des, evolutionary and ecological ones. In the context of the evolutionary theory, process of
evolution is, rather metaphorically, represented in a form of (reduced to) branching phyletic
lineages, which fragments are treated as (phylo)species. This theory sets the context for the
phylogenetic species concepts. In the context of ecological theory, the (eco)species is treated
as an element of the ecosystem structure; this serves as a justification for the ecological spe‐
cies concepts. As noted above (see 4.1), within the conceptual pyramid of the species prob‐
lem proper, these two groups of concepts are thought to be generalized by the evolutionary
species concept. But the latter itself remains without a more general justification. For such a
justification, some higher-level ontological model (meta-model) is requested, which would
treat the biota on a unified basis of both evolutionary and ecological standpoints.
Such a model would imply that the biota is a global evolving ecosystem. Within biology, a
rather general theory of phylocenogenesis presumes such consideration, according to which
phylogenetic development of the species units occurs within the ecosystems providing them
with the diversity of ecomorphological units [94]. However, there is a more general ontolog‐
ical model (concept) treating the biota as a non-equilibrium system described in the terms of
synergetics mentioned already in the previous section. From this perspective, any system of
such kind is “doomed” to develop, and its development leads to its hierarchical structuring
[95]. In the case of biota, its historical development, commonly referred to as the biological
evolution, entails its structuring due to causal relationships that regulate flows of matter, en‐
ergy, and information [96]. Thus, the biotic structure, with all its constituent elements
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(units), is an inevitable (axiomatic) consequence of historical development of the biota as a
non-equilibrium system.
Meanwhile, according to this model, though presuming evolution of the biota as a whole,
different categories of causes (proximate, initial, material, etc.), to the extent that they are in‐
dependent and are not reducible to each other or to a single more general cause, act in a
complementary manner and give rise to mutually irreducible and mutually complementary
aspects (manifestations) of the overall biotic structure. Two such general aspects are being
usually considered, the above mentioned ecological and phylogenetic, each with its own
specific hierarchy; there are might be more of them, but these two are enough for the present
issue. In each of them, their own structural elements (units) of different levels of generality
are being patterned, which not only are not obliged to, but even cannot coincide, as they are
generated by the discordant causes.
An important part of the structuring of the evolving biota is appearance of (quasi)discrete
elements (units) of certain (not exactly fixed) levels of generality. One of these are of higher
levels (such as local ecosystems or monophyla), others are of lower levels (such as eco‐
morphs or species). In the latter case, following the established tradition, at least some of
these elements (units) can be uniformly designated as the species, though with explicit indi‐
cation of the hierarchy they belong to (phylo-, eco-, etc.). At the same time, it is to be kept in
one’s mind that, in some approaches to describe these hierarchies, it is possible to do with‐
out the notion of species at all (see 3.3).
In this regard, again and inevitably, a fundamental question arises about what, if any, is ex‐
actly the “species in general” in its traditional meaning inherited from the classical science.
To answer it within the above general causal model of the evolving biota, of primary impor‐
tance becomes a task to elaborate a concept of some universal element (unit) of the biotic
structure, with which it could be possible to associate actually “primary”, or “ideal” species
concept. The latter should probably include a reference to an area of intersection (or interac‐
tion) of general categories of causes, under which effect certain structural unit equally rele‐
vant to both (and other conceivable) hierarchies is emerged. Evolutionary species concept,
not a once mentioned above, seems to fit this condition more than any other biologically
meaningful concept. However, attempts to elaborate something more extensive in its con‐
tent used to be resulted in so called “combinatorial” type of concept (in sense of [97]), with
not definition proper, but with just a more or less long list of properties thought to be essen‐
tial for the species (such as in [2]).
Such a “combinatorial” status of the general species concept seems to be due an effect of the
so called “Hull principle” [10, 98-99], which means theoretical impossibility for the multidi‐
mensional “species in Nature” to be defied by a single exhaustive “formula”. This principle,
in its turn, is a consequence of (a) inverse relationship between strictness and richness of any
natural science concept and/or notion and (b) the uncertainty relation between mutually ir‐
reducible species characteristics presumed by the principle of subsidiarity. With the “Hull
principle” in effect, the above mentioned framework concept (see 4.1), and not a definition,
might be a candidate for such a desired theoretical construct. It would allow to fix and to
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investigate certain pattern of structural organization of the biota at the level of generality at‐
tributed traditionally to the species.
In the cognitive situation given by the biota’s ontological model just outlined above, any
general definition of the species, whatever might it be, should be a final link in a downward
cascade of definitions of higher levels of generality, forming their own conceptual meta-pyr‐
amid. At the latter’s tip, there appears such (or any other appropriate) biotic model as an
“ultimate beginner” for the species concepts in general. At some lower level of this meta-
pyramid, definitions of the causes of the biotic structure are fixed, then definitions of ele‐
ments (units) of that structure go, and finally a definition of the species as one of these
elements (units) of the biotic structure is formulated. Such a cascade of the inclusive defini‐
tions corresponds clearly to the sequential reduction of the initial basic ontological model to
some particular species model (concept) (see 3.3).
It follows from the foregoing that, in a general biological theory relevant to the species is‐
sues, one of the principal notions should be not that of the species, but of a discrete element
(unit) of the biotic structure. So, the “species problem” turns out to be the “biotic unit prob‐
lem”. As it was indicated above, such a unit (element) may be conventional species, phy‐
logroup, ecomorph, age phase, etc., and the species in its current common understanding is
just “one the many” of these elements. Accordingly, the tip of the conceptual pyramid of the
species problem proper should be not any “ideal” species concept proper, but rather the
general concept of the unit (element) of the biotic structure, a particular case of which is the
species concept being sought.
It is evident that such a biotic model, whatever general might it be, should have its own
meaningful foundation, which means that it itself should be built into a higher-level pyra‐
mid, in which the model in question becomes a “logical species” of some “logical genus”. So
the point is that an “ultimate beginner” at far higher level of generality is needed for sub‐
stantiation of the very biotic model. This obviously extends the cognitive situation of the en‐
tire species problem beyond the biological issues.
Remaining within the framework of the above synergetic model, it might be reasonable, in
order to substantiate a possibility to treat the biota as a particular kind of the non-equilibri‐
um system, to look at some other versions of the latter to analyze how they are being struc‐
tured and if there is something in common to all them that might somehow correspond to
the species in its general biological understanding. System of scientific knowledge may
serve as another instance of such kind of non-equilibrium systems, which development, ac‐
cording to evolutionary epistemology, can be liken to the biological evolution [100]. From
this perspective, particular scientific ideas and concepts can be considered as particular
“species” or some “species-like entities” that are born, live and extinct just like the biological
species [101-102]. One cannot exclude that such an expanded way to consider the species
problem would allow to formulate it more correctly for the biological science. In this con‐
text, of certain meaning could be an idea of the “ontological species” [11, 103] as a manifes‐
tation of the same type of organization of such systems, regardless of their particular
natural, cognitive, or any other status.
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5. Evolving specieshood
It was noted above that, within a given cognitive situation, designation of any natural phe‐
nomenon by a single notion implies that it is endowed with certain fundamental property
that is preserved in all its appearances and thus distinguishes it from other natural phenom‐
ena of the same kind. In the classical terminology, such a property is routinely designated as
the essence; as to the species in its most general sense, its essence was suggested to denote as
the “specieshood” [9, 10, 99, 104]. By an initial assumption, it is the latter that makes the spe‐
cies what it is by its “nature”, distinguishes it from other units of the biota’s structure, and
marks eventually the species level of organization of the living matter, i.e. defines the “spe‐
cies as a rank”.
From this, it is evident that one of the key issues in the species problem is that about the
“specieshood”, namely, about that possible specific quality, which makes any species the
species and distinguishes the latter from other units of the structured biota. The main part of
this issue is, whether a fixed level can be found in the hierarchical structure of the biota that
would correlate quite strongly with the “specieshood”.
Addressing to the essence (essential characteristics) of the species as a natural phenomenon
obviously involves the species problem in what is called the “modern essentialism”. I do not
intend to discuss here this very sophisticated matter; I would rather note only that, if the
“species is Nature” is not supposed to be just an arithmetic sum of its constituent organisms,
but is indeed a natural phenomenon endowed with some emergent properties, then it is
quite normal to speak of its essence [105-106].
The main objections against essentialist interpretation of the species, within the biological
consideration of the species problem (i.e. leaving aside philosophical arguments for and
against essentialism), are as following: the species (a) evolve and (b) are organized in differ‐
ent ways. This contradicts an initial assumption of the classical essentialism, according to
which essences should be permanent and universal for particular commonalities (such as
“natural kinds”). The latter point corresponds evidently to the stationary world picture ori‐
ginated from the classical (Platonic) natural philosophy. However, within the contemporary
global evolutionism, a fundamentally different interpretation of essentialism is rather ad‐
missible, allowing for a possibility of evolutionary changes of the essences themselves [107].
5.1. Evolution of the species
The above (see 4.2) synergetic model of the biota as an evolutionary non-equilibrium system
may be taken as a background of a concept of the evolving specieshood. According to this
model, life on Earth had historically originated and then was gradually developing; this is a
kind of the “central dogma” of the whole modern evolutionism. This development implied
gradual structuring of the biota, including before all formation of ecosystems and their com‐
plication by means of structuring the flows of matter, energy and information.
A part of this gradual structuring was as gradual formation and perfection of units of the
biotic structure involved in the regulation of these main flows. Partly repeating (see 4.2), it
The Species Problem - Ongoing Issues24
should be emphasized that these flows are patterned by different categories of causality,
and to the extent that the latter generate and arrange these flows more or less independent‐
ly, structural units of the ecosystems are formed within each flow more or less independent‐
ly from each other, as well. Using the current terminology, one can assume that structuring
of the ecological component includes formation and specialization of ecomorphological
units (ecomorphs), while structuring of the phylogenetic components includes formation
and specialization (differentiation) of the phylogenetic units (let they be termed species).
This idealized model presumes that the “ecomorph way” of organizing the biota was being
formed along the formation of ecosystems as a mode of structuring the flows of matter and
energy. Respectively, the “species way” of organizing the biota was being formed with the
formation of phylogeny as a mode of structuring the information flows. The both was being
formed simultaneously but due to different causes. It follows from this consideration that
such a dissociation of ecological (ecomorphs) and phylogenetic (species) ways of structuring
the evolving biota lead to a well known discrepancy between units of ecological and phylo‐
genetic patterns. On the one hand, this made it principally possible for the species units to
become ecomorphologically differentiated, with emergence of ecologically different
“morphs” (such as age phases) within them. On the other hand, different species evolved
similar ecomorphological features to fit similar ecological niches. The above mentioned phy‐
locenogenetic theory (see 4.2) allows to connect these ways of the biota structuring in a gen‐
eral model; this provides a meaningful theoretical background for a metaphorical
interpretation of the species as “genealogical actors” playing particular roles in the “ecologi‐
cal theater” accordingly to certain environmentally and historically written “scripts” [39].
As it  was noted above,  this  ontological  model  is  more consistent  with treatment  of  the
species  as  a  phyletic  lineage.  As  to  the  “specieshood”,  it  can  be  generally  understood
from this perspective as basically an ability of stable reproduction of species-specific epi‐
genetic  systems (in sense of  [108])  in the course of  their  evolution.  This reproduction is
carried  out  through  mechanisms  that  provide  (a)  certain  closeness  of  the  species  gene
pools,  and (b)  transfer  of  the  genetic  information with  minimal  distortion from genera‐
tion to generation [109-110].  Cleavage of these gene pools (speciation) leading to the di‐
vergent  phylogeny  is,  from the  synergetic  standpoint,  a  consequence  of  structuring  the
biota at the ecosystem level.
This model implies the following general picture of the evolution of both the “species” as a
natural phenomenon and the “specieshood” as its essential characteristics. First, the species
as a unit of the biotic structure was formed not immediately, but gradually with the evolu‐
tion of biota. Second, the main direction of evolution of the species, as a biological phenom‐
enon, was perfection of mechanisms for maintaining the integrity and stability of this unit at
the epigenetic level. Finally, these mechanisms may be different in different groups of or‐
ganisms, which expose different manifestations of the specieshood.
Specifying to a degree this evolutionary scenario, one can assume the following. At the be‐
ginning of historical formation of the species, there were loosely organized units of the pro‐
karyotic diversity without effective mechanisms of epigenetic stability maintenance, so they
cannot be strictly distinguished as ecomorphs or species proper [111]. At the end of this evo‐
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lution, there are units with highly developed mechanisms of maintenance and transfer of
relatively stable integrated epigenetic systems by means of bisexual reproduction. Thus, the
peak of the specieshood evolution appears to be the biospecies in its “reproductive” under‐
standing, i.e. that of Dobzhansky—Mayr.
5.2. So many kinds of species…
According to the above model, two main conclusions about ontology of the “species in Na‐
ture” can be drown.
First, a general framework for consideration of the species ontology in its general sense
should be the process-structuralism treating the species as a “process-system” [112]. In a
more particular version, the species such understood can be considered as a more or less
tightly organized “historical group” [113]. The latter amendment allows to emphasize phy‐
logenetic parameter as one of the key characters of the specieshood.
Second, this model can serve as one of the ways of ontological justification of the species be‐
ing endowed objectively with different kinds of ontology. Indeed, both the “species in Na‐
ture” as a unit of the biotic structure and the specieshood as its essential characteristic
change with the evolution of the biota. This results in that both degree and ways of integra‐
tion of the species such understood may be different due to various natural history of the
particular groups of organisms. So the species (even in its narrow phylogenetic meaning) ap‐
pears to be a heterogeneous unit, and its heterogeneity is quite objective, though at least in
part it does reflect different ways of looking at nature. In the traditional terms, this heteroge‐
neity is referred to as different “kinds of species”.
From the standpoint of ontology, the least integrated historical groups may correspond to
“natural kinds” with an added historical dimension [104], this case is partly fits the category
of “kumatoid” [114]. The most integrated groups may correspond to the ontological catego‐
ry of the individual or rather the “quasi-individual” [10, 39, 99, 113, 115-120].
Going back to the core of the species problem (see 2.1), it becomes more than clear that the
ontological model just presented involves recognition of the “species pluralism” as an irre‐
movable part of that problem. It should be acknowledged as a part of the objective reality,
so it seems to be reasonable not to “fight” with it but to reflect it somehow in the thesaurus
of the above “eidology” (see 1). This means, among other things, that recognition of hetero‐
geneity of the “species in Nature” requires to fix different “kinds of species” terminological‐
ly to make the above thesaurus more adequate to that reality. An example with A. Dubois’
“mayron”, “simpson”, “kyon”, etc. [121] indicates that there is a big room for a “term-crea‐
tivity”. But do new terms actually provide any solution? [122].
A part of this issue should be terminological separation of different stages and forms of “be‐
ing” of the species unit proper. A radical response to this question is a suggestion to call
“species” only those units which meet the reproductive criterion and to treat any other
forms of organismal diversity at this level of generality as simply “non-species” [8, 28, 109].
A more moderate and therefore more sensible would be to use existing apt terms such as
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“quasi-species”, “para-species” and “eu-species” [10, 13, 109, 123-124] to refer to different
stages and results of evolution of the specieshood.
Another part of the same issue is clarification of conditions of correct comparison of dif‐
ferent species concept. For instance, routine direct contrasting phylogenetic (genealogical)
and  biological  (reproductive,  genetic)  species  concepts  seems  to  be  incorrect,  because
they are relevant not to the same but to clearly different aspects of the specieshood. Us‐
ing the formalized terminology introduced above (see 3.2), they correspond to projection
of the same notion of the species to different “sub-axes” of ontological axis of the concep‐
tual  space.  Indeed,  the phylogenetic  species concept considers respective unite  from the
phenomenological point of view, fixing its place in the sequence of phylogenetic events.
Unlike  this,  reproductive  concept  considers  the  species  from  the  causal  point  of  view,
pointing  to  a  specific  mechanism  that  maintains  integrity  and  isolation  of  the  species.
Therefore, they cannot directly compete in the same conceptual space. In order to elimi‐
nate  this  confusion,  it  seems reasonable  to  fix  the  term “biological”  for  the  “species  in
Nature” of any living organisms in its general (mostly evolutionary) sense, and to use a
special term for the species outlined by the Dobzhansky—Mayr’s concept to refer correct‐
ly  to  its  principal  character;  it  might  be  cospecies,  with  its  prefix  borrowed  from  the
cohesion concept of Tempelton [125].
For such a terminological fixation of various “kinds of species” to be sound, it is requested
first of all to make it clear whether there actually is some fundamental unit in biotic struc‐
ture, viz. the “species in general”, which may be designated as a “logical generic” notion
with respect to the “logical species” notions of the different “kinds of species”. If supposedly
there does not exist such a unit proved conclusively to be the same for the various aspects of
the biotic structure (ecological, phylogenetic and occasionally any other), then perhaps it is
unjustified to use a single rooted notion of the “species” (or “specion” of Duboi [121]), albeit
with different prefixes.
To put this question a little bit more formally, it can be considered as a matter of semantics
of the term “species”. It seems to be clear that, for the latter to be really a rigid designator, as
Ereshefsky [73] supposes, its denominator (referent) should be defined as strictly as possi‐
ble. In this particular case, “strictly” means “narrowly”; accordingly to the terms adopted
here, the subspace occupied by the species notion within the general conceptual space (see
3.2) should be restricted to a certain fixed meaning minimizing its different treatments. Oth‐
erwise, the term “species” will remain a non-rigid designator distinguishing different enti‐
ties in each of possible worlds construed by either phylogenetic or ecological or ethological
or else variables.
In such a case, the species notion should probably be restricted to the phylogenetic (genea‐
logical, generational) understanding of the species. Accordingly, for the units recognized in
the ecological hierarchy at the level of generality comparable to that of the species, it is pos‐
sible to use such a term as “ecomorph” or any other proposed, say, in the framework of bio‐
systematics (see 4.1).
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As for the “species in classification” belonging to the “third world” of Popper (see 3.4), it
makes sense to use the term “taxospecies” to designate it. This allows to fix terminologically
that single level of common structure of biota, which refers to different partial manifesta‐
tions of a hypothetical “species in Nature” of the same, though also hypothetical, “species
rank”.
6. What if not the species?
One aspect of the overall species problem is the strong embeddedness of the species notion
in the thesaurus of many fundamental and applied biological disciplines. This seems to pre‐
vent any actually radical solution of that problem presuming rejection of the species notion
(as suggested in [126]), because it would lead to a substantial reorganization of the concep‐
tual apparatus at the expense of that rejection. The reason is quite obvious; such a rejection
entails necessarily rejection (or replacement) of other terms associated in one or another way
with the species notion.
For example, replacing species by phylogroup should entail in an obvious way replacing of
speciation by some other, such as phyliation [127]. Generally speaking, there is nothing criti‐
cally wrong with such a change in case of strictly phylogenetic interpretation of biological
evolution. However, it is not evident that other biological disciplines taking the latter in a
more extended sense will enjoy abandon the concept of speciation in their descriptions of
historical changes of the biological objects studied by them.
In ecology, as noted above (see 3.3), the species notion is not obligatory for description of the
structure of local ecosystems, it is enough to deal with ecomorphs. However, in comparative
analysis of different ecosystems, there is an evident need for some basic units of comparison
that allow to relate soundly ecomorphs, recognized in each of the local ecosystems, to each
other. It occurs that it is the species that fulfills currently such a function; for evolutionary
ecologists, ecomorphs exist in the local ecosystems not by themselves but as manifestations
of the local populations of widespread (different or same) species [128].
It seems to me that this particular aspect of the species problem is not just a consequence of
conservatism of the conceptual apparatus of biology, but reflects one of the universally valid
epistemological principles. According to the latter, in order to explore any differences be‐
tween the objects, one must have some basis for comparison by which these objects can be
considered as components of a single commonality (elements of the same set, tokens of the
same natural kind, etc.) possessing some fundamental feature(s) in common. For many re‐
search tasks in biology, this basis means conspecificity, i.e. belonging of organisms, differing
from each other in some way, to the same species as objectively existing natural unit pos‐
sessing some unique particular manifestation of the specieshood. From this perspective, it is
clear that, in order to get rid of the species notion in biology, it is necessary to introduce oth‐
er basis for comparison, with substantiating such a replacement by reference to some biolog‐
ically meaningful and sufficiently general theory.
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7. In conclusion
Development of the species problem seems to be directed toward a better understanding of
the following biologically meaningful questions: what is the species in its general (biological
rather than formal) understanding, viz. if there is the species as a universal (all-embracing)
unit of the biotic structure, or it has but a partial character; why and what are manifestations
of this “species in general” and what are the causes of existence of both such “species in gen‐
eral” and its particular manifestations (“kinds of species”).
It seems to me that a necessary condition for development of the species problem in such a
way should be comprehension of its complexity, not allowing for any radical and simple (in‐
cluding purely empirical) solutions. This complexity of the problem in question reflects
complexity of both the entire cognitive situation, in which this problem is explored, and that
fragment of the ontological component, which corresponds to the general species concept.
One of manifestations of the species problem is arrangement of the species concepts and
definitions of different levels of generality into a conceptual pyramid. Its “ultimate begin‐
ner” should be a kind of ontological model, in which a causally based conception of the
species is inferred as one of the structural elements of the biota as an evolving non-equili‐
brium system.
The impetus for the further effective development of the species problem in the direction
just pointed may be its consideration within the context of non-classical scientific paradigm.
In particular, of great importance should be understanding of the cognitive situation as a
conceptual space that is shaped by interaction of three components, viz. objective (ontologi‐
cal), epistemic and subjective [129]. Such a consideration provides eventually understanding
of the species concept in its both general and partial senses as a particular cognitive con‐
struct. This will give a fresh look at the content of the entire multi-dimensional species prob‐
lem, at its structure and key questions, as well as at relationships between different species
concepts as “forms of being” of this problem.
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